Abstract-Consider a mobile ad hoc network where the nodes belong to different authorities. The nodes must be given incentives to spend their resources (battery power and transmission bandwidth) in forwarding packets that originate at nodes belonging to another authority. This can be done by assigning a credit balance to each node: when a node acts as an originating node it uses its credits to pay for the costs of sending its own traffic; when a node acts as a transit node it earns credits by forwarding traffic from other nodes. This paper presents a credit-based incentive scheme which assists nodes when they lack the credits necessary to transmit their data. An essential part of the credit-based scheme is a decentralised credit redistribution mechanism to destroy (create) credit at nodes that are over (under) supplied with credit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) where packet transmissions occur between mobile nodes which belong to different authorities. Although a node benefits from being a sender or a receiver, it is less clear how nodes benefit from forwarding traffic on behalf of other nodes. If the nodes belong to different authorities, then the nodes may have no motivation to use their resources to forward traffic which originates at nodes belonging to another authority. However, if nodes do not forward traffic, the MANET would fail to function. The nodes must be given an incentive to spend their resources (battery power and bandwidth) in forwarding packets that originate at other nodes.
Crowcroft et al. [4] present such an incentive scheme which employs a credit balance at each node. The nodes use credits to pay for the costs of sending their own traffic, and earn credits by forwarding traffic from other nodes. The incentive scheme is decentralized: no central controller is needed, and the scheme therefore has favourable scalability properties [5] . An incentive mechanism similar to [4] was previously presented in Buttyán and Hubaux [1] . Buttyán and Hubaux [2] describe the hardware and software mechanisms required to support security and cooperation in wireless networks.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the credit-based incentive scheme. Section IV defines the performance measures which are used to measure the effect of various fraudulent activities on the performance of the network. Section III describes the network model and its parameter values. Section V investigates the effect of the various frauds on the performance of the network. The conclusions are presented in Section VI. Initial experiments indicate that the credit-based incentive scheme is inherently robust with respect to the various frauds investigated.
II. CREDIT-BASED INCENTIVES
A. The credit balance and the packet purse.
Each node has a credit counter which records the current credit balance at the node. Let B i (t) denote the value (the credit balance) stored in the credit counter at node i at time t. Each packet p contains a counter (the packet purse) in the packet header. Let b p (t) denote the value stored in the purse in packet p at time t.
Each node levies a charge when transmitting a packet and when receiving a packet. A congestion charge
is applied at node i to receive or to transmit a packet where n i (t) is the number of packets queued at node i at time t and n i is the maximum size of the packet queue at node i.
With reference to Fig. 1 , consider a packet p that is offered to the originating node i of route r at time t. Let o(r) and d(r) denote respectively the origin and the destination nodes of route r. The originating node is required to pay a price of C r = 2|r| credits where |r| is the length (hop count) of route r. If the originating node has insufficient credit (line 2), the packet is dropped -this is referred to as the economic admission test. Otherwise, if the packet queue is not full, the packet is queued (line 13), the originating node is debited C r credits (line 14) and the packet purse is initialised to C r (line 15).
When at time t a packet begins transmission at node i, the credit counter at node i is incremented by an amount c i (t ) (line 19) as defined in Eqn. (1) which represents payment for transmission, and this amount is deducted from the packet purse (line 20) . When at time t a packet completes transmission and arrives at node j, the credit counter at node j is incremented by an amount c j (t ) (line 23) which represents payment for reception, and this amount is deducted from the packet purse (line 24).
When at time t * the packet p arrives at the destination of route r, the contents b p (t * ) of the packet purse represent the // A packet p is offered for transmission at time t // at the originating node i of route r. 1: function ECONOMICADMISSIONTEST(packet p, node i)
if B i (t) < C r then // insufficient credit 3: drop packet p at node i 4:
enqueueAndPay(p, r) 
// decrement the purse 21: end function // A packet p completes transmission and arrives at node j. 
// decrement the purse 25: amount that the originating node was under-or over-charged. If b p (t * ) > 0 then the originating node was over-charged and the underspend b p (t * ) is credited to the destination node. If b p (t * ) < 0 then the originating node was under-charged and the overspend b p (t * ) is debited to the destination node.
The credit payment mechanism rewards destinations for receiving packets along less congested routes, and penalises destinations for receiving packets along more congested routes. On the other hand, an originating node is rewarded for sending a packet along a congested route (the originating node should have paid more than the fixed price of 2|r| credits), and penalised for sending a packet along a less congested route (the fixed price of 2|r| was excessive), which does not seem sensible. However, the originating node of a route cannot exploit the difference between the instantaneous and the fixed price of the route in order to benefit or disadvantage either itself or the destination of the route since it is assumed that the originating node has no knowledge of the instantaneous prices being charged at the nodes of the route.
B. Credit redistribution
In contrast to [1] credits are redistributed in that credits are periodically destroyed at nodes that have a surplus of credits and credits are periodically created at nodes that have a deficit of credits. In addition, when a packet arrives at its destination, if the contents of the packet purse are positive, then the purse contents are credited to the destination node. If the contents of the packet purse are negative, then the purse contents are debited to the destination node. The credit exchange mechanism and credit redistribution distinguish our credit-based incentive scheme from that in [1] .
Credit redistribution works as follows. Consider a credit redistribution event at node i at time t. Let δ denote the credit redistribution rate. Let Δ denote the credit redistribution interval (the time interval between successive redistribution events) at node i. Let B denote the target credit balance and let B i (t) denote the credit balance at node i at time t. The credit balance at node i is adjusted
so that nodes that possess an amount of credit that exceeds the target credit balance will destroy a fraction δ of the surplus per unit time, while nodes whose credit balance is less than the target credit balance will create a fraction δ of the deficit per unit time.
No centralised mechanism is needed to redistribute credit. A node that has a surplus of credit will over a period of time destroy a fraction of that surplus. Likewise a node that has an under-supply of credit will over a period of time create a fraction of that deficit.
Credit redistribution is essential to the performance of the credit-based incentive scheme. Credit redistribution ensures that under-supplied nodes are able to send some traffic, while at the same time providing sufficiently-supplied nodes with a mechanism for disbursing a fraction of their credits rather than accumulating them.
Credit redistribution ensures that credit allocation is robust in that the total amount of credit in the system converges towards the sum of the target credit balances of all nodes, provided the redistribution scheme is correctly parameterised. Nodes which enter or leave the network (nodes can be created and destroyed) or credits which are lost due to for example packets carrying credits to be paid to downstream nodes being dropped (thus payment is never credited) have only a temporary impact on the performance of the credit-based scheme.
III. THE NETWORK MODEL
We developed a discrete event simulator that models contention-based access according to the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function [6] . The simulator models the RTS/CTS protocol which is used when transmitting frames larger than the RTS threshold. The simulation model was tested against an identical implementation using the ns2 simulator [7] and good agreement was obtained. The network model is configured with 50 nodes. The model assumes a flat terrain of 875 m × 875 m that is partitioned into a 7 × 7 grid of cells. Each cell is 125 m × 125 m. One node is initially placed at random in each cell. The 50 th node is placed at random on the plane. The simulator uses the ns2 default radio attenuation model. The carrier sense range is 550 m and the transmission range is 250 m. The cell size is 125 m so that the network is initially connected.
Each node has a bandwidth of 11 Mbps and a battery of power 0.5 W . Each node has a packet queue which can store 50 packets. Each node attempts 5 packet transmissions per second. Each packet is 1,554 bytes long. The packet transmissions take place at the instants of a Poisson process. Each transmission selects a random destination node. RTS/CTS is enabled. Least hop count routing is used. Each simulation experiment models 2,500,000 packet transmissions.
Two mobility models are investigated namely all nodes are immobile, and all nodes are mobile and move according to the random waypoint model [3] where the velocity v of the nodes is sampled from a uniform distribution and 0.25 ≤ v < 0.75 m/s; the pause time is 10 seconds.
The economic parameter values were chosen to maximise the performance of the 50-node network model described above: the target credit balance B = 80, the credit redistribution rate δ = 0.05 and the credit redistribution interval Δ = 10 ms.
A. The effect of the economic incentive model
A node is said to be an edge node if it carries a small number (not more than 10) of routes. Edge nodes are usually located near the periphery of the network. Edge nodes have few opportunities for earning credit apart from the credit acquired by means of credit redistribution. A node is said to be a central node if it carries a large number (not less than 100) of routes. Central nodes are usually located near the centre of the network. Central nodes have many opportunities to earn credit.
A packet offered to an originating node will be dropped if the originating node lacks the credit necessary to pay the costs of the end-to-end transmission of the packet. Nodes acquire credit by forwarding packets that originate elsewhere. However, nodes which carry few transit routes will be unable to acquire credit and are disadvantaged. Packets which pass the economic admission test may be still be dropped due to packet queue congestion at the originating or at the transit nodes. Table I summarises the performance of the 50-node network model. For example, when the nodes are immobile, and when the credit-based incentive model is disabled (row 2) and enabled (row 3), the table shows that the credit-based incentive improves the total packet success probability (PSP -the probability that a packet arrives at the destination -see Section IV), the edge nodes have a slightly reduced PSP and the central nodes have an improved PSP. The credit-based incentive has little impact on the network throughput, but greatly reduces the network delay due to shorter packet queues at originating edge nodes.
IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS: THE EFFECT OF FRAUD
The packet success probability (PSP) is determined by the availability of credit at the originating node and by the occupancy of the packet queues at the originating and the transit nodes. The packet success probability (PSP) at node i in the interval (t − τ, t) is given by
Given that the interval τ = 1 second in all the simulation experiments, we write E i (t, τ ) as E i (t) and P i (t, τ ) as P i (t).
The effect of fraud on the performance of the network being simulated is measured as follows. Throughout a simulation experiment, the PSP P i (t) and the ESP E i (t) are computed once per second. The moving average value (averaged over the last 100 seconds) of P i (t) is added to bin k of a 10-bin histogram where k = (100 × E i (t)) mod 10.
When the simulation ends, the histogram is processed to yield the network-wide average PSP P 0 , the PSP P 1 as observed when 0 ≤ ESP < 0.5 so that P 1 measures the PSP at nodes which attempted to transmit a packet when they were under-supplied with credit, and the PSP P 2 as observed when 0.5 ≤ ESP ≤ 1 so that P 2 measures the PSP at nodes which attempted to transmit a packet when they were sufficientlysupplied with credit.
A similar process is applied to measure the effect of fraud on the end-to-end delay yielding the network-wide average delay D 0 , the delay D 1 as observed when 0 ≤ ESP < 0.5, and the delay D 2 as observed when 0.5 ≤ ESP ≤ 1.
V. FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES
We investigated the effect of various fraudulent activities on the performance of the credit-based incentive scheme namely (1) conditionally ignoring the credit balance test, (2) manipulating the credit redistribution rate, (3) manipulating the credit redistribution interval, (4) manipulating the target credit balance, (5) stealing the contents of the packet purse, and (6) manipulating the resource prices. Limited space allows us to present (1), (4) and (6) .
We show that, in the absence of hardware and software mechanisms [2] to support security and to prevent fraudulent activity, the credit-based scheme is inherently robust with respect to the fraudulent activities listed above, provided the nodes behave in a rational manner. Rational behaviour implies that the nodes behave in such a way as to reduce the possibility of the fraud being detected, committing fraudulent acts infrequently rather than frequently, committing 'small' frauds rather than 'large' frauds, committing fraud in the expectation of receiving a reward, and not committing fraud when to do so would offer little benefit.
Our first experiment will examine a network of immobile nodes. In the remaining experiments the nodes are mobile, the routes are dynamic, radio interference will affect the performance of the network when the nodes form clusters and longer routes may be used when when voids arise.
A. Conditionally ignoring the credit balance test
Consider a node which originates a packet that is to be transmitted to a destination node. The credit management logic presented in Fig. 1 is now revised so that a node may ignore the outcome of the credit balance test. The revised // A packet p is offered for transmission at time t // at the originating node i of route r. // The fraud parameter 0 ≤ F ≤ 1.
if B i (t) < C r and E i (t) > F then 3: drop packet p at node i 4:
enqueueAndPay(p, r) // standard credit mechanism 6: end if 7: end function logic is presented in Fig. 2 , which replaces the corresponding procedure in Fig. 1 .
With reference to Fig. 2 , at line 2 node i checks if the value B i (t) stored in the credit counter at node i is sufficient to pay for the costs C r incurred in transmitting the (tagged) packet from its origin i to its destination along route r. If B i (t) < C r then the tagged packet would ordinarily be dropped for economic reasons.
Suppose that an originating node which has insufficient credit does not drop the tagged packet, but accepts the packet (line 2) if the node's ESP was relatively low in the recent past, which occurs when E i (t) ≤ F where 0 ≤ F ≤ 1 is the fraud parameter. The credit counter will become negative. However, the credit deficit at the node will be rectified at the next credit redistribution event at the node. Note that a packet which fraudulently passes the economic admission test may be still be dropped due to packet queue congestion at the originating or at the transit nodes.
The credit balance fraud is only committed by a node when it experiences a (relatively) low ESP. The low ESP may be a transient occurrence or it may be a permanent feature and it is most likely to occur when the node finds itself at the edge of the network where it is part of few transit routes and thus has little opportunity to earn credit. Fig. 3 shows that when credit redistribution is enabled and as the fraud parameter F increases and more fraudulent acts are committed
• the average PSP P 0 remains approximately constant, • P 1 improves: packets originating from nodes which are under-supplied with credit are now accepted rather than being immediately rejected, but they can be dropped along the route due to increased packet queue congestion at the originating or at the transit nodes, • P 2 deteriorates: packets originating from nodes which are sufficiently-supplied are accepted as usual, but are dropped along the route due to increased packet queue congestion, • the network delay deteriorates due to increased packet queue congestion.
Committing credit balance fraud leads to a trade-off: nodes that are under-supplied with credit benefit and nodes that are sufficiently-supplied with credit are disadvantaged. However, if fraudulent acts are committed frequently, the resulting long delays and the deteriorating PSP's of the sufficiently-supplied nodes may provide a means for detecting the fraudulent activities and this should discourage rational actors from committing frequent fraudulent acts. On the other hand the community might condone the credit balance fraud because nodes that have insufficient credit to send their own data may have important data to send to the community.
Note that the PSP deteriorates if credit redistribution is disabled: compare the plots when credit distribution is enabled and the plots when credit distribution is disabled, Credit redistribution is essential to the working of the credit-based incentive scheme. It would be irrational for a node that is under-supplied with credit to disable the credit redistribution mechanism, since this mechanism is the primary means for such a node to obtain credit. Redistribution counters the effects of the fraudulent acts committed by the nodes. For example, if fraud gives rise to a credit surplus, a part of that surplus will be destroyed in the next credit redistribution event. Likewise, if fraud gives rise to a credit shortage, a part of that deficit will be created in the next credit redistribution event.
B. Fraudulently manipulating the target credit balance
Suppose when a credit redistribution event takes place a node fraudulently increases its target credit balance. Fig. 5 shows the logic that implements the target credit balance fraud. The node commits fraud only when it is likely to benefit (line 3), and by an amount that is proportional to its need (line 4). // A credit redistribution event occurs at node i at time t. // The fraud parameter 1 ≤ U ≤ 20. // TCB is the correct value of the target credit balance. 1: function TARGETCREDITBALANCE(node i)
2:
B := TCB // the target credit balance 3: if B i (t) < B then 4:
end if 6: b := δ * Δ * (B − B i (t)) With reference to Fig. 5 , when a credit redistribution event takes place, the target credit balance B is manipulated (line 3) if the current value B i (t) of the credit balance is less than the target credit balance B. Next, the value of the target credit balance is adjusted (line 4) according to the current value E i (t) of the ESP at node i: the fraud is less severe if the node has a large ESP. This prevents unnecessary fraud and reduces the possibility of the fraudulent node being detected. Finally, the credit balance at node i is incremented (lines 6 and 7). The credit and queue management logic presented in Fig. 1 is used to regulate packet transmission and reception. Committing target credit balance fraud seems to be benign. Under-supplied nodes benefit and sufficiently-supplied nodes are almost unaffected. The deterioration of the end-to-end delay when the nodes frequently commit fraud should deter rational actors from committing fraud. The resulting long delays may lead to the detection of the fraudulent activity.
C. Fraudulently manipulating the congestion charge
When a packet is transmitted or received by a node, a payment (the congestion charge) is subtracted from the packet purse and this payment is added to the node credit counter.
Suppose a node fraudulently manipulates the congestion charge c i (t) when a packet is transmitted or received by a node. Fig. 7 shows the logic that implements the congestion charge fraud at a node. The node commits fraud only when it is likely to benefit (line 10), and by an amount that is proportional to its need (line 13).
With reference to Fig. 7 , the congestion charge c i (t) is manipulated if the current value B i (t) of the credit balance is less than the target credit balance B. Next, a uniform random decision is taken (line 12) whether to adjust the congestion charge or not. The charge is adjusted (line 13) according to the current value E i (t) of the ESP at node i: the fraud is less severe if the node has a large ESP. This prevents unnecessary fraud and reduces the possibility of the fraudulent node being detected. The fraudulent congestion charge cannot exceed 1.5 which is the largest value that a congestion charge can takesee Eqn. (1) . The procedures in Fig. 7 are added to the credit and queue management logic presented in Fig. 1 which is used to regulate packet transmission and reception. Fig. 6 shows the PSP and the delay as a function of the fraud parameter F in the case where all the nodes are mobile. The figures show that the performance of the network is largely impervious to the congestion charge fraud. If the transit nodes under/over-charge, they acquire less/more credit and the destination node acquires more/less credit. The surplus/deficit at each node will be rectified at the next credit redistribution event at the node. // A packet p completes transmission at node i at time t. 1: function FRAUDCREDITTRANSMIT(packet p, node i) 2: manipulateCongestionCharge(i) 3: creditTransmit(p, i) // standard credit mechanism 4: end function // A packet p completes transmission and arrives at node j. 5: function FRAUDCREDITRECEIVE(packet p, node j) 6: manipulateCongestionCharge(j)
7:
creditReceive(p, j) // standard credit mechanism 8: end function // The fraud parameter 0 ≤ F ≤ 1. // C i (t) is the correct value of the congestion charge. 9: function MANIPULATECONGESTIONCHARGE(node i)
10:
if B i (t) < B then if U (0, 1) < F then // uniform deviate U (0, 1) 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the effect of various fraudulent activities on the performance of a credit-based incentive scheme that is designed to give nodes in a mobile ad hoc network an incentive to spend their resources in forwarding traffic that originates from other nodes. The fraudulent activities are confined to abusing components of the credit management system. We show that the credit-based scheme is inherently robust with respect to the fraudulent activities, provided the nodes behave in a rational manner. The fraudulent activities lead to a trade-off. Nodes at the edge of the network which are often under-supplied with credit benefit, and nodes at the centre of the network which are usually sufficiently-supplied with credit are disadvantaged. Committing fraud frequently is either benign -under-supplied nodes benefit slightly and sufficientlysupplied nodes are almost unaffected -or the network is impervious to the fraud. We show that credit redistribution is the main reason why the credit-based incentive scheme is relatively immune to the fraudulent activities investigated in this paper. Finally, if fraudulent acts are committed frequently, the resulting long delays may provide a means for detecting the fraudulent nodes and this should discourage rational actors from committing frequent fraudulent acts.
